El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer una explicación de la legitimidad de ciertos argumentos ad hominem acudiendo a la epistemología de las virtudes. La tesis central es que hay argumentos ad hominem que son aceptables si se conciben como argumentos inductivos cuya fuerza está determinada por una apelación justa a los vicios epistémicos del interlocutor. Se argumenta que algunos argumentos ad hominem abusivos son aceptables si descansan en un señalamiento justo de la (...) carencia de virtudes epistémicas confiabilistas por parte del interlocutor. Así mismo, algunos argumentos ad hominem circunstanciales serían aceptables si descansan en un señalamiento justo de la carencia de virtudes responabilistas por parte del interlocutor. El artículo también expone cómo otros intentos de reivindicación de los argumentos ad hominem adolecen de algunos problemas. (shrink)

Este libro estudia cuestiones pertenecientes al campo de la lógica aplicada, concretamente de teoría de la argumentación informal. Abarca el análisis de los principales tipos de errores por incom­petencia argumentativa a partir de un enfoque nor­mativo actualizado y con una propuesta de taxono­mía de falacias lógicas informales basada en los cri­terios básicos de buena argumentación. Se identifi­can, describen y ejemplifican, con textos de varios niveles de dificultad, las falacias más habituales (en­tre ellas, las falacias «ad hominem, ad populum, petitio (...) principii», por inducción precipitada, falsa analogía, falso dilema) presentes en diferentes interacciones lin­güísticas interpersonales (documentos políticos, pe­riodísticos, pseudocientíficos, filosóficos) formu­ladas en lenguajes naturales. A lo largo del libro, los principales epígrafes se ilustran con textos extraídos del «Quijote» y de obras de Lewis Carroll. En los capí­tulos iniciales se abordan asuntos previos recomen­dables para la buena comprensión de los capítulos de desarrollo de falacias específicas, a saber, la re­la­ción entre lógica y retórica, los distintos tipos de ar­gumentos, la relación entre razonar y argumentar, el lugar de las emociones en la argumentación falaz y las distintas teorías y definiciones de falacia, así como los errores conceptuales más comunes asociados con el término o el vínculo entre falacias y paradojas. Se re­servan dos capítulos finales, uno sobre falacias bioéticas contemporáneas, y otro con una propuesta de «Código de Buenas Prácticas Argumentativas», fun­damentado en los criterios a partir de los que se ela­bora la taxonomía de falacias del libro. (shrink)

¿Por qué está mal hacer una petición de principio, formular una pregunta compleja, desplazar la carga de la prueba, crear un hombre de paja o usar lenguaje cargado? ¿En qué consiste el error argumentativo de las "falacias informales"? ¿Es siempre incorrecto argumentar ad hominem, ad populum, ad verecundiam? La lógica formal ha dejado estas preguntas sin respuesta, pues nunca ha sido su cometido indagar los entresijos pragmáticos de la argumentación cotidiana, más allá de las relaciones de inferencia. En cambio, (...) a la teoría de la argumentación le interesa todo aquello que forma parte del buen argumentar, incluido lo que la lógica no alcanza. Este libro es una introducción a la teoría de la argumentación, con especial atención al estudio de las falacias informales. En él se exponen los modelos más influyentes para la distinción entre buena y mala argumentación, y se discute si alguna teoría de la falacia podría servir como modelo para evaluar argumentos. Se analiza también la función del catálogo tradicional de falacias, la distinción entre malos argumentos y argumentos falaces, la posibilidad de desarrollar una teoría de la falacia digna de ese nombre e, incluso, la coherencia del concepto mismo de falacia. (shrink)

La polémica fue un importante evento cultural durante el siglo XIX en Cuba. De 1838 a 1840 se debatieron en los principales periódicos de la isla temas en torno a la metafísica, la epistemología, la ética, la pedagogía y la influencia del eclecticismo de Víctor Cousin. Exploro en esta investigación brevemente algunos de los hechos históricos que antecedieron a esta polémica. Arguyo que es inexacta la interpretación predominante que esta polémica fue motivada por el deseo de independizar a Cuba de (...) España. Tal interpretación promueve un mito de emancipación. Según mi análisis, cuando en su intervención en la polémica José de la Luz y Caballero apela al patriotismo, establece sin saberlo un precedente peligroso que usarán los autodenominados protectores del patriotismo para restringir los debates públicos. -/- La polémica filosófica en la Habana se refiere a una serie de debates públicos que acaecieron en el siglo XIX en Cuba principalmente entre jóvenes intelectuales de la época. Con frecuencia estos debates resultaron en argumentos apasionados y algunas veces en ataques ad hominem entre los participantes de dicha polémica. -/- . (shrink)

En la literatura referente al transhumanismo hay mucho espacio dedicado a descripciones y taxonomías, pero escasa discusión en profundidad de las bases y límites de los planteamientos teóricos subyacentes. Los críticos apostan en demasía por los argumentos ad hominem, mientras que los partidarios se entretienen más de lo conveniente en exaltar las futuras prestaciones de un progreso exponencialmente acelerado. En este texto se intenta llevar a cabo una reflexión más serena, centrada en las nociones de «esencia humana», «naturalización» (...) y «autoconciencia». (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that evidence-focused strategies of science communication may be complemented by possibly more effective rhetorical arguments in current public debates on vaccines. I analyse the case of direct science communication - that is, communication of evidence - and show that it is difficult to effectively communicate evidential standards of science in the presence of well-equipped anti-science movements. Instead, I argue that effective rhetorical tools involve ad hominem strategies, that is, arguments involving claims of expertise. I (...) provide a rationale, and sketch a methodology, for using ad hominem arguments in science communication. (shrink)

Se examina el problema de la circularidad argumental en la fundamentación del conocimiento desde la teoría de la argumentación. Los argumentos dirigidos a probar que sabemos son sospechosos de dos falacias: petición de principio y apelación a la ignorancia. Se examinan las definiciones clásicas de ambas falacias y se dictamina que bajo tales definiciones los argumentos fundamentadores serían falaces. A continuación se proporcionan nuevas definiciones de ambas falacias, más acordes con el trabajo reciente en teoría de la argumentación (...) y se sostiene que, bajo estas definiciones, no todos los argumentos fundamentadores son falaces. In this paper I examine the problem of circularity in the justification of knowledge from the point of view of argumentation theory. I introduce the expression founding argument for the arguments we use to try to prove that we know, and explain the classical account of the two fallacies that may be committed: ad ignorantiam and petitio principii. A new definition of both fallacies, based on recent work in the theory of argumentation, is used to show that not every founding argument is fallacious. (shrink)

En este artículo se discuten las más importantes hipótesis modernas que han intentado explicar la interrelation doctrinal que los tratados silogísticos escritos por Boecio tienen entre sí, el De sylhgismo categórico y la Introductio ad syllogismos categóricos. Se revisan las hipótesis que señalan una dependencia fuerte entre ambos tratados y también las que apuntan hacia una dependencia más débil y, luego de criticar estas posiciones, la discusión abre la posibilidad cierta de que los tratados tengan objetos temáticos diferentes y estén (...) relacionados de una manera más extrínseca que lo que se había creído hasta aquí, ya que el segundo de ellos estaría pensado como un complemento al primero. El argumento se basa tanto en la manifiesta falta de utilidad que los términos indefinidos tendrían en las premisas silogísticas como en la casi nula noticia de que, alguna vez en la antigüedad, se desarrolló una silogística con términos indefinidos en las premisas. (shrink)

Walton gives a clear method for analyzing and evaluating cases of ad hominem arguments found in everyday argumentation.

In his refutation of skepticism in book IV of De rerum natura, Lucretius uses argumentative methods typical of Epicurus: the περιτροπή is in many ways similar to that used by the philosopher in book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως, the same book where, in a passage dedicated to the criticism against determinists, can be found a reference to the criterion of the πρόληψις, that Lucretius exploits in his refutation. Moreover, Lucretius develops a strong demonstration concerning the irrefutability of αἴσθησις as a (...) criterion of truth, which finds significant points of contact with a large fragment, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius and generally traced back to the Canon of Epicurus. The last argument used by the poet is a pragmatic one: for the skeptic it would be impossible to live. The argument is similar to the praxis-based argument used by Epicurus in the Περὶ φύσεως against the partisans of determinism. But the pragmatic argument goes back to a very ancient layer of anti-skeptical polemics, even prior to Epicurus and already present in book Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Although later influences cannot be excluded, Lucretius appears to be a faithful witness of Epicurus. Probably in a lost section of the Περὶ φύσεως, the philosopher of Samos showed positions going against skeptical or proto-skeptical attitude, contemporary or earlier to the time of the philosopher, probably developed in a Democritean or a Socratic context. Epicurus’ ad hominem strategy is very close to that of the philosopher in the Principal Doctrines XXIII–XXV, and certainly follows Aristotle’ strategy in book Γ of Metaphysics against those who deny the principle of non-contradiction. In a similar way, Epicurus does not have one figure as the objective of his refutation but constructs a hypothetical dialectical opponent capable of embodying a series of philosophical tendencies judged by the founder of Kepos to be extremely dangerous not only for the correct exercise of thought but for the human being’s life itself. (shrink)

El artículo presenta, en primer lugar, una introducción al libro VIII del De Genesi ad litteram. Posteriormente pone de manifiesto sus principales temas exegéticos y teológicos. Se aborda en primera instancia, la recensión que hace san Agustín de los diversos comentarios anteriores a él sobre el tema del paraíso, así como su propia propuesta exegética. Se aborda asimismo la cuestión de la creación, el árbol del bien y del mal, la interpretación del trabajo del hombre en el jardín del Edén, (...) destacando la importancia y la dilogía del verbo latino colo (dar culto, cultivar). El artículo aborda asimismo la cuestión de la providencia divina, y se destacan los elementos trinitarios, cristológicos y antipelagianos que pueden encontrarse en el libro VIII del De Genesi ad litteram. Todos estos argumentos son abordados haciendo referencia a los comentarios agustinianos anteriores al libro del Génesis, particularmente el De Genesi aduersus manicheos y el De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber. (shrink)

An ad hominem fallacy is committed when an individual employs an irrelevant personal attack against an opponent instead of addressing that opponent’s argument. Many discussions of such fallacies discuss judgments of relevance about such personal attacks, and consider how we might distinguish those that are relevant from those that are not. This paper will argue that the literature on bias and testimony can helpfully contribute to that analysis. This will highlight ways in which biases, particularly unconscious biases, can make (...) ad hominem fallacies seem effective, even when the irrelevance is recognized. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper responds to two issues in interpreting George Berkeley’s Analyst. First, it explains why the text contains no discussion of religious mysteries or points of faith, despite the claims of the text's subtitle; I argue that the subtitle must be understood, and its success assessed, in conjunction with material external to the text. Second, it’s unclear how naturally the arguments of the Analyst sit with Berkeley’s broader views. He criticizes the methodology of calculus and conceptually problematic entities, and the (...) extent to which they require one to bend the rules of classical mathematics. Yet, elsewhere, Berkeley’s opinion of classical mathematics and its intelligibility is low, and he defends a pragmatic approach to word meaning that should not find fault with so functionally successful a theory. The ad hominem intention of the text makes it difficult to discern to what extent Berkeley is committed to the sincerity of these criticisms. This component of the text is rarely discussed, but I argue that when trying to decide what Berkeley’s true position is in the Analyst, we should treat its ad hominem component as its primary intention. (shrink)

This paper is ultimately about the nature of argumentation in general and about the nature of practical argumentation in particular. (Practical argumentation is the form of argumentation which aims at answering the question: ‘What is to be done?’) The approach adopted here is an indirect one. I analyze one traditional form of argumentive fallacyargumentum ad hominem and try to show that in some argumentative situations it is an intuitively legitimate move. These intuitions can be explained if we accept that (...) practical argumentation is also governed by the general rules of practical rationality. (shrink)

Neste ensaio, parto da pergunta acerca da motivação original dos Diálogos sobre a religião natural de Hume : de onde a propensão para o argumento pelo desígnio obtém força suficiente para prevalecer sobre a propensão natural a se acreditar nos sentidos e na experiência? Em minha hipótese, os Diálogos, não obstante seu título, representam uma falha na compreensão mútua. Enfocando o drama da peça, pretendo mostrar que, em Cleantes, eles expõem um viés prosélito no teísmo moderno; mais especificamente, que apontam (...) subterfúgios ad hominem que se acoplam aos argumentos teístas, com o fim de evitar os argumentos do ceticismo irreligioso de Fílon. Assim, no que concerne aos argumentos filosóficos, a força do desígnio, parece-me, deve-se a uma má retórica, indício do que denomino Hipótese Prosélita, denunciada por Fílon em, pelo menos, três momentos dos Diálogos. Acredito que esse fator, pouco observado na literatura, ajuda a explicar a perseverança da propensão ao desígnio, fenômeno que sempre intrigou Hume. (shrink)

This is a critical examination of Johnstone's thesis that all valid philosophical arguments are ad hominem. I clarify his notions of valid, philosophical, and ad hominem. I illustrate the thesis with his refutation ofthe claim that only ordinary language is correct. r discuss his three supporting arguments (historical, theoretical, and intermediate). And r criticize the thesis with the objections that if an ad hominem argument is valid, it is really ad rem; that it's unclear how his own (...) theoretical argument can be ad hominem; that if an ad hominem argument is really valid, it would have to be based on the proponent's own assumptions; and that the thesis is not true of philosophical arguments that are constructive rather than critical. (shrink)

Ad hominem arguments argue that some opponent should not be heard and no argument of that opponent should be heard or considered. The opponent has generally pernicious views, false and harmful. Moreover he is diabolically clever at arguing for his views. Thus, the ad hominem argument is essentially a device by which non-intellectuals try to wrest control of a dialectical situation from intellectuals. Stifling intellectuals, disrupting the dialectical situation, is an unpleasant conclusion, but no fallacy has been shown (...) in what leads up to that conclusion. (shrink)

This chapter deals with one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, ad hominem: circumstantial. The circumstantial variety of the ad hominem argument is distinct from the direct form in that instead of directly attacking the character of the arguer, one draws attention to an inconsistency in the personal circumstances of the proponent (his/her commitments) and the content of his/her argument/position as a way to question his/her sincerity or credibility. As with all the ad hominem argument forms, (...) the ad hominem: circumstantial has both fallacious and legitimate uses. Fallacious uses of the ad hominem argument type are pernicious, in part, because of how difficult it can be to respond to them in an effective way. One of the main issues with ad hominem arguments is telling which are fallacious and which are not. (shrink)

This article outlines criteria for the evaluation of the argumentum ad hominem (argument against the person, or personal attack in argument) that is traditionally a part of the curriculum in informal logic. The argument is shown to be a kind of criticism which works by shifting the burden of proof in dialogue through citing a pragmatic inconsistency in an arguer's position. Several specific cases of ad hominem argumentation which pose interesting problems in analyzing this type of criticism are (...) studied. (shrink)

No início do século XIV, Raimundo Lúlio, contrapondo-se aos mestres em Artes por ele identificados como averroistae , desenvolveria não menos que dois métodos resolutivos de inconsistência, a fim de refutar aquelas teses filosóficas que divergem da fé cristã. Um deles serve-se de silogismos contraditórios capazes de expressar a estrutura de um argumento ad hominem , ao passo que o outro nada mais é do que uma reductio ad impossibile elaborada com base em suposições contraditórias.

No início do século XIV, Raimundo Lúlio, contrapondo-se aos mestres em Artes por ele identificados como averroistae, desenvolveria não menos que dois métodos resolutivos de inconsistência, a fim de refutar aquelas teses filosóficas que divergem da fé cristã. Um deles serve-se de silogismos contraditórios capazes de expressar a estrutura de um argumento ad hominem, ao passo que o outro nada mais é do que uma reductio ad impossibile elaborada com base em suposições contraditórias. In the early fourteenth century, Ramond (...) Lully, opposed to university philosophers whom he identified as averroistae, developed no less than two methods for the resolution of inconsistency, in order to refute philosophical theses which diverge from the Christian faith. The first of these uses contradictory syllogisms expressing the structure of an ad hominem argument, while the other is a reductio ad impossibile produced with contradictory suppositions. (shrink)

This chapter deals with one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: ad hominem: tu quoque. An ad hominem: tu quoque argument is often seen in political debate. As Walton stresses: “The primary case of the tu quoque type of ad hominem retort occurs when an ad hominem reply is used to respond to an ad hominem attack”. As with all the ad hominem argument forms, the ad hominem: tu quoque has both fallacious (...) and legitimate uses. Fallacious uses of the ad hominem argument type are pernicious, in part, because of how difficult it can be to respond to them in an effective way. One of the main issues with ad hominem arguments is telling which are fallacious and which are not. The chapter looks at some examples to illustrate the use of proponent's ad hominem, and respondent's ad hominem. (shrink)

This chapter deals with one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called ad hominem: bias. The ad hominem argument form is one way of engaging another's character. It is the direct or indirect impugning of a person's character that unites the various forms of the ad hominem argument. Many textbook accounts of the ad hominem argument are much too cavalier in their approach, often treating the ad hominem argument form as usually/always fallacious. As with (...) all the ad hominem argument forms, the ad hominem: bias has both fallacious and legitimate uses. Fallacious uses of the ad hominem argument type are pernicious, in part, because of how difficult it can be to respond to them in an effective way. The chapter looks at some examples to illustrate the use of proponent's purported bias relevant to the argument/position. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, ad hominem: direct. An ad hominem argument is an argument “to”, “toward”, or “against” the person. As with all of the ad hominem argument subtypes, the ad hominem: direct occurs in the context of some kind of dialogue or exchange, real or imagined. That is, an ad hominem occurs in response (the respondent) to the stated argument/position of another person. Instead of addressing the (...) argument/position of the proponent, the respondent addresses the proponent's character in such a way that his credibility is questioned in order to either question or refute his argument/position. The central complication when dealing with the ad hominem: direct is that while ad hominem arguments are often fallacious, they are also often legitimate. Fallacious uses of the ad hominem argument type are pernicious, in part, because of how difficult it can be to respond to them in an effective way. (shrink)

In all three of its manifestations, —abusive, circumstantial and tu quoque—the role of the ad hominem is to raise a doubt about the opposite party’s casemaking bona-fides.Provided that it is both presumptive and provisional, drawing such a conclusion is not a logical mistake, hence not a fallacy on the traditional conception of it. More remarkable is the role of the ad hominem retort in seeking the reassurance of one’s opponent when, on the face of it, reassurance is precisely (...) what he would seem to be ill-placed to give. Brief concluding remarks are given over to an examination of rival approaches to the ad hominem, especially those in which it is conceived of as a dialectical error. (shrink)

Argumentation theorists are beginning to think of ad hominem arguments as generally legitimate. Virtue argumentation theorists argue that a character trait approach to argument appraisal can explain why ad hominems would are legitimate, when they are legitimate. But I argue that we do not need to appeal to virtue argumentation theory to explain the legitimacy of ad hominem arguments; a more straightforward evidentialist approach to argument appraisal is also committed to their legitimacy. I also argue that virtue argumentation (...) theory faces some important problems, and that whereas the virtue-theoretic approach in epistemology is well-motivated, that motivation does not carry over to virtue argumentation theory. (shrink)

Many of us read Peter Singer ’ s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common for students, upon grasping the implications of Singer ’ s argument, to ask whether Singer gives to famine relief. In response it might be tempting to remind students of the (...) ad hominem fallacy of attacking the person advancing an argument rather than the argument itself. In this paper I argue that the “ ad hominem reply ” to students ’ request for information about Singer is misguided. First I show that biographical facts about the person advancing an argument can constitute indirect evidence for the soundness / unsoundness of the argument. Second, I argue that such facts are relevant because they may reveal that one can discard the argument without thereby incurring moral responsibility for failing to act on its conclusion even if the argument is sound. (shrink)

Abstract Jeffrey Koperski claims in Zygon (2008) that critics of Intelligent Design engage in fallacious ad hominem attacks on ID proponents and that this is a “bad way” to engage them. I show that Koperski has made several errors in his evaluation of the ID critics. He does not distinguish legitimate, relevant ad hominem arguments from fallacious ad hominem attacks. He conflates (or equates) the logical use of valid with the colloquial use of valid. Moreover, Koperski doesn't (...) take seriously the legitimate concerns of the ID critics, and in doing so, commits the straw man fallacy. In the end, I show that no one disagrees with the criticism of improper use of fallacies as methods of evaluation. But what constitutes proper, relevant evaluation of the ID theorists and their motivation is a matter of dispute. And sometimes attacking a person as a method of evaluation is justified, and thus is not fallacious. The definition of ad hominem arguments as either a “good way” or a “bad way” rests on justification, which I argue ID opponents have. The basis for these good objections relies on the motivation many Christians have to share their faith with non-Christians, which they call the “great commission.”. (shrink)

The recent literature on ad hominem argument contends that the speaker’s character is sometimes relevant to evaluating what she says. This effort to redeem ad hominems requires an analysis of character that explains why and how character is relevant. I argue that virtue epistemology supplies this analysis. Three sorts of ad hominems that attack the speaker’s intellectual character are legitimate. They attack a speaker’s: (1) possession of reliabilist vices; or (2) possession of responsibilist vices; or (3) failure to perform (...) intellectually virtuous acts. Legitimate ad hominems conclude that we should not believe what a speaker says solely on her say-so. (shrink)

Intentaremos reconstruir la controversia acerca de la posibilidad de un lenguaje privado. Analizamos primero las posiciones “epistemológicas” (Malcolm y Fogelin), mostrando sus fallos. Luego analizamos la versión “semántica” (Kenny y Tugendhat) encontrándolas igualmente fallidas. La crítica de Barry Stroud a los argumentos trascendentales como argumentos antiescépticos nos permite discernir el presupuesto común que debilita las posiciones anteriores. Asimismo, la reconstrucción permite apreciar mejor la manera en la que la versión de Kripke evita comprometerse con este presupueto. Argumentamos que (...) esta versión es la única versión consistente del argumento. Esta afirmación obliga afrontar algunas de las objeciones corrientes dirigidas a la propuesta de Kripke: el problema de la objetividad de la regla, ¿puede un individuo estar acertado en contra de la opinión comunitaria consensuada?; y el problema de las relaciones internas entre reglas y casos, presuntamente violentada por el rol que la noción de acuerdo comunitario desempeña en la misma. Sostenemos que nuestra reconstrucción de la controversia permite encontrar razones para mostrar por qué las objeciones mencionadas no se le aplican. -/- This paper tries to reconstruct the controversy on the possibility of private language. First, we analyse “epistemological” trends in the argument (Malcolm, Fogelin) showing their failures. Then, we analyse “semantic” versions (Kenny, Tugendhat) finding they are also failed. Barry Stroud’s criticism of transcendental arguments as refutations of scepticism allows us to discern the common presupposition that weakens the versions of the argument considered. Moreover, this reconstruction allows us to see how Kripke’s deals with the problem of the previous discussion in order to avoid committing himself with this presupposition. We consider Kripke’s version to be the only consistent version of the argument. Such a statement obliges us to consider two of the most important criticisms directed against Kripke’s Wittgenstein: The problem of objectivity of the rule: Can a single individual be right in contradicting communal assent?; and the problem of internal relationships between rules and their applications, allegedly violated because of the role played by communal agreement. We claim that our reconstruction of the controversy provides good reasons to show that the above-mentioned objections don’t apply to Kripke’s Wittgenstein version. (shrink)

Perelman’s view of the role of persons in argument is one of the most distinctive features of his break with Cartesian assumptions about reasoning. Whereas the rationalist paradigm sought to minimize or eliminate personal considerations by dismissing them as distracting and irrelevant, Perelman insists that argumentation inevitably does and ought to place stress on the specific persons engaged in an argument and that the relationship between speaker and what is spoken is always relevant and important. In taking this position, Perelman (...) implicitly revives the classical conception of proof by character (ethos or “ethotic” argument), but despite an extended discussion of act and person in argument, The New Rhetoric does not give much consideration to the classical concept and confuses differing approaches to it within the tradition. The result is that Perelman treats the role of the speaker in argument only by reference to abstract techniques and does not recognize the importance of examining particular cases in order to thicken understanding of how ethotic argument works in the complex, situated context of its actual use. Consequently, Perelman’s account of the role of persons in argument should be supplement by reference to case studies, and to that end, I consider ethotic argument in W.E.B. Du Bois’ famous essay “Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others”. (shrink)

I came to the formal study of theology after years as an activist both in the USA and in Perú, and from that work of activism, in which I am still involved, I have learned that one of the best approximations we can have to reality comes if we see life, if we see reality, as a process. So I entered and have stayed with the elaboration of Mujerista Theology in this sense of engaging in a process. Processes have to (...) be mindful of both content and method and that is what I have tried to do in my work. I have seen my work as providing a platform for the voices of grassroots Latinas who are admirably capable of reflecting on their faith and its meaning in their daily lives — in lo cotidiano — and they are perfectly capable of explaining that faith. I entered this process of doing theology with certain intuitions that I think are still operative today though their meanings have evolved and others have been added. I do not think it is of value to spend my time and energy answering ad hominem critiques. I am not willing to allow others to define my agenda and take up my time when their goal is not dialogue but rather criticism for the sake of criticism. (shrink)

This article explores the modalities by which referring to past discursive performance of adversaries within a continuous polemical exchange is used in ad hominem attacks. Our starting point holds that in the context of lengthy debates, participants and third-party listeners share a rhetorical memory, which, dynamic and subjective as it may be, allows for the evaluation of participants’ characters based on their perceived discursive performances. By analysing opinion articles related to the Israeli political debate, this study shows how drawing (...) inference from adversaries’ prior statements and conduct is used to compromise their credibility as participants in the polemical exchange. It is found that, alongside supporting arguments from inconsistent commitment, previous discursive performance is mobilized to discredit speakers’ epistemic authority and their moral legitimacy. (shrink)

A healthy and robust public political culture is generally regarded as being of utmost necessity for the maintenance of a stable democratic environment. Especially when a country is facing significant challenges and is in the process of devising and implementing radical reforms, the presence of satisfactory collective deliberation can ensure durability and stability. This article will focus on one type of argumentation that stands in the way of such healthy deliberation. It will explore the various forms that ad hominem (...) arguments take and consider the harmful consequences of their wide prominence in the political culture of the country. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XX, Number 2, November 1994, pp. 211-218 Symposium A version of this paper was presented at the symposium on A Progress of Sentiments by Annette C. Baier, held at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Los Angeles, March 1994. Response to My Critics ANNETTE C. BAIER I thank my critics for their generous compliments on what they find good about my book, and (...) thank them even more for their criticisms. Both my critics query the role given to reason, in my version of Hume's version of our nature. If David Owen is right, I downplay Hume's scepticism, in Treatise Book I, about what we can expect of what he there calls our reason, and, if Rachel Cohon is right, I downplay Hume's scepticism in Books II and III about the role of reason in our passionate and active lives. Cohon even charges that my Hume is barely distinguishable from Samuel Clarke. Grave charges! In response, I want first to concede that in A Progress of Sentiments I should have given more space to the section "Of scepticism with regard to reason" than I did, and that, even though I did not purport to more than touch on Hume's attitude to other philosophers, I should have more explicitly acknowledged the background role of Clarke as Hume's target, throughout the Treatise, and given more emphasis to Hume's anti-religious aims, which I mention from time to time, but do not dwell on. I could also have given more prominence to Hume's treatment of liberty and necessity, and have said a bit more about Hume's section, "Morality not based on reason." As Rachel Cohon says, I dismiss what, for some, is the distinctively Humean claim that morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions as largely an ad hominem move against rationalists who expect their pronouncements about eternal fitnesses, or divine commands, to produce or prevent actions, possibly by exciting fear of divine punishment. The Humean moral sentiment, I claimed, is not an Annette C. Baier is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh PA 15260 USA. 212 Annette C. Baier especially motivating passion, although it does normally produce good will towards those whose character traits it approves, and some dislike of those whose character traits are disapproved. So it may excite some self-dislike, when it is our own character that we find distasteful, or produce some pride, if we pass muster. Hume writes: "There may perhaps, be some, who being accustom 'd to the style of the schools and pulpit, and having never consider'd human nature in any other light than that in which they place it, may here be surpriz'd to hear me talk of virtue as exciting pride, which they look on as a vice..." (T 297). So Humean morals does often excite passions. But pride and humility, Hume claims, are "compleat in themselves," not "attended with any desire" (T 367), so are not directly motivating passions. And even the love and hatred that are felt towards fellow persons for their virtues and vices may, as motivating influences on the will, have to compete with other loves, such as esteem for the rich and powerful. Hume is a realistic and often rather cynical moralist, and has no easy story about how the moral sentiment can produce the virtues of which it approves. Still, there is some active power in the moral sentiment. It is an impression, namely a sentiment or "peculiar pleasure," not an idea, and so not a belief. In my book I first contrasted Humean sentiments with beliefs in Chapter 1, discussing the conclusion of Book I, and then continued to discuss passions in Chapter 2, on association. There it is said plainly enough that, for Hume, it is pleasure and pain on which most of our passions are founded. (He exempts some instinctive desires.) His own decision to continue with his philosophical journey, after the near shipwreck of Part 4 of Book I, is based, he claims, on the fact that he would be the loser in point of pleasure if he inhibited his philosophical impulses. But... (shrink)

Ad hominem arguments are generally dismissed on the grounds that they are not attempts to engage in rational discourse, but are rather aimed at undermining argument by diverting attention from claims made to assessments of character of persons making claims. The manner of this dismissal however is based upon an unlikely paradigm of rationality: it is based upon the presumption that our intellectual capacities are not as limited as in fact they are, and do not vary as much as (...) they do between rational people. When we understand rationality in terms of intellectual virtues, however, which recognize these limitations and provide for the complexity of our thinking, ad hominem considerations can sometimes be relevant to assessing arguments. (shrink)

El presente trabajo propone analizar la manera en que Agustín de Hipona recepciona el pensamiento de Tertuliano, autor cristiano latino, también africano, del que lo separan unos 200 años. Las principales menciones al cartaginés tienen lugar en la crítica agustiniana a la concepción de la corporeidad del alma defendida por Tertuliano. A fin de poder analizar los argumentos y los conceptos filosóficos utilizados por el hiponense en el desarrollo de su crítica presentamos, en primer lugar, una breve introducción a (...) Tertuliano (c. 160- c. 220), deteniéndonos en algunos pasajes cruciales de su obra titulada _De anima_ (208/210). En segundo lugar, nos dedicamos a presentar y analizar la discusión que lleva adelante Agustín respecto de la tesis de la corporeidad del alma humana en _De Genesi ad litteram _(finalizado hacia el 415)_,_ y en _De anima et eius origine, _escrita posteriormente, entre 419 y 420. Evaluamos entonces la posición del hiponense respecto de la hipótesis traducionista sobre el alma humana, ciertamente vinculada al corporalismo defendido por Tertuliano. (shrink)

The situationally disqualifying ad hominem attack is an argumentative move in critical dialogue whereby one participant points out certain features in his adversary's personal situation that are claimed to make it inappropriate for this adversary to take a particular point of view, to argue in a particular way, or to launch certain criticisms. In this paper, we discuss some examples of this way of arguing. Other types of ad hominem argumentation are discussed as well and compared with the (...) situationally disqualifying type. The socalled Houtlosser Dilemma highlights the danger of unconditionally condoning ad hominem arguments. We propose a classification of ad hominem, and a more restrictive use of the term 'circumstantial'. Finally, we discuss whether ad hominem arguments are (always?) to be rejected as fallacious. (shrink)

Ad hominem arguments are generally dismissed on the grounds that they are not attempts to engage in rational discourse, but are rather aimed at undermining argument by diverting attention from claims made to assessments of character of persons making claims. The manner of this dismissal however is based upon an unlikely paradigm of rationality: it is based upon the presumption that our intellectual capacities are not as limited as in fact they are, and do not vary as much as (...) they do between rational people. When we understand rationality in terms of intellectual virtues, however, which recognize these limitations and provide for the complexity of our thinking, ad hominem considerations can sometimes be relevant to assessing arguments. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to explore the interrelation between persuasion tactics and properties of speech acts. We investigate two types of arguments ad: ad hominem and ad baculum. We show that with both of these tactics, the structures that play a key role are not inferential, but rather ethotic, i.e., related to the speaker’s character and trust. We use the concepts of illocutionary force and constitutive conditions related to the character or status of the speaker in order (...) to explain the dynamics of these two techniques. In keeping with the research focus of the Polish School of Argumentation, we examine how the pragmatic and rhetorical aspects of the force of ad hominem and ad baculum arguments exploit trust in the speaker’s status to influence the audience’s cognition. (shrink)

Douglas N. Walton considers the question of whether the conventions of informal conversation can be articulated more precisely than they are at present. Specifically, he addresses the problem of the fallacy of ad hominem argumentation as it occurs in natural settings. Can rules be formulated to determine if criticisms of apparent hypocrisy in an argument are defensible or refutable? Walton suggests that they can, and ultimately defends the thesis that ad hominem reasoning is not fallacious per se. He (...) carries his analysis to the core of action--theoretic reasoning--by examining a number of specimen arguments. As suggested by the title, the conclusion of ad hominem argument is demonstrated to be relative to the arguer's position. In the appendixes of the book, articles by Gerald McAuliffe and Gordon R. Lowe illustrate vivid and powerful cases in which Walton's contentions are put to the test. (shrink)

This paper looks into the known evidence on the origins of the type of argument called the circumstantial ad hominemargument in modern logic textbooks, and introduces some new evidence. This new evidence comes primarily from recent historical work by Jaap Mansfeld and Jonathan Barnes citing many cases where philosophers in the ancient world were attacked on the grounds that their personal actions failed to be consistent with their philosophical teachings. On the total body of evidence, two hypotheses about the roots (...) of the circumstantial ad hominem are considered. One is that it came from Aristotle through Locke. The other is that it may have had separate roots in these ancient philosophical writings that criticized philosophers for not practicing what they preached. (shrink)